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The FPC which has been approved by the FDA is produced by the solvent extraction process. Under this process, whole fish are first washed with water, then ground up, and then washed again with water. The product is then washed with 10 successive washes of a boiling solvent—isopropyl alcohol—to remove the water, fat, odor, oil, and nonprotein nitrogen. The fish used by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries for its tests is the hake, a lean, bony fish. The hake is found plentifully on both the east and west coast of the United States. Red hake and silver hake, presently used in small part as food for humans and more widely as animal food, are caught in quantity south of No Man's Land, which lies close to Martha's Vineyard in Massachusetts. In fact, much of the fish used in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries' tests was hake caught in the No Man's grounds.

Species other than hake, however, abound in U.S. coastal waters, are presently not commericially exploited and are readily susceptible to use in FPC. Fisheries specialists have estimated that the annual U.S. catch could be 28.5 billion pounds of fish—over five times 1959–63 average of 5.1 billion pounds. Of this 23.4-billion-pound increase, Atlantic and gulf waters would supply over 50 percent; Pacific waters about 38 percent, and lakes, streams, et cetera, 12 percent. Nearly 40 percent of the additional catch will come from waters within 3 miles of our coastline and from interior waters, while about 25 percent would be taken within 3 to 12 miles of the coast-line.

The importance of FDA's approval of fish protein concentrate to the commercial fishing industry of the United States cannot be overestimated. This industry has been plagued with obsolescent equipment, rising processing costs, declining markets and strong foreign competition. While the United States consumes 12 billion pounds of fish a year, for example, only 5 billion pounds is U.S. catch; the rest is imported. And the percentage of U.S. consumption which is imported is steadily rising.

Senator BARTLETT introduced a bill in the last session of Congress which became law when signed on November 2, 1966, by the President—in Senator BARTLETT'S home State of Alaska. This is fitting tribute to his leadership in the fight to win approval for FPC.

Under the provisions of that bill, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to construct one FPC production plant, and to lease another, to demonstrate the feasibility of production of FPC by the commercial fishing industry. The Secretary was, in addition, given authority to undertake research into the technology and feasibility of FPC products. The Secretary could not begin construction or leasing, however, until after approval by the FDA of FPC under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

Consequently, no funds were appropriated in the last session of Congress to carry out the construction or leasing activities authorized by the act. We are fortunate, however, that $429,000 was authorized for the research activities contemplated by the act, and I have been assured by the Department of the Interior that they are proceeding with the research activities.

The administration's budget for fiscal year 1968 requests the funds for the construction of one plant, but does not include a request for funds to lease another plant. It is of critical importance that the funds be appropriated for the construction of the one demonstration plant. It is equally as important, if we are to produce FPC in any meaningful quantity, that the funds for the leased plant be appropriated as authorized by the Congress.

It is my belief, Mr. President, that the provisions of the bill which passed last year, though they are indeed a first step, do not go far enough toward providing the hungry people of the world and of the United States with the benefits of FPC.

We know FPC is safe and wholesome. We know it is wonderfully rich in protein but very low in cost. We have the technology to produce it. We have an industry in need of the market. And we have needs to fill—the needs of hungry millions. I am reminded of the words of President Kennedy's inaugural address:

> To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves . . . not because the Communists are doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.

I therefore propose:

First, the Secretary of Interior be authorized to construct at least two additional plants for the production of FPC. The plants should utilize other processes than the solvent extraction process. If leasing should prove more desirable than construction, then the Secretary should be authorized to lease the plants instead of constructing them. The testimony of Mr. Donald McKernon, former Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, indicates that the enzymatic digestion or cellular disruption processes may be better suited than the solvent extraction process where fatty or oily fish are involved.

Second, coincident with the construction of these plants must be a continued research program into the processes best suited to the reduction of fish to FPC. This research program should continue to be directed by the Secretary of the Interior, but his authority should be expanded and the amount of funds available to him for these research purposes should be increased. The test sample approved by the FDA was not produced in a large-scale plant, but in a model plant of small capacity.

Third, an extensive program of research, demonstration and field testing should be instituted to determine the best uses of FPC in the preparation of the supplemented food products. This research and demonstration program will, of course, be largely the responsibility of private industry, but the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries can continue to play its vital stimulant role.

Fourth, information on nutritional needs and deficiencies should be gathered and compiled to assure that appropriate priorities are established both at home and abroad for the rapid distribution of FPC. This informational function should be the responsibility of the Public Health Service and the Office of Economic Opportunity, at home, and of the State Department, working with the United Nations, abroad.

Fifth, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Economic Opportunity should be kept advised of the progress made in production and development of FPC. They should begin planning at an early date to assure that no unnecessary delays will be caused in the distribution of FPC.

Sixth, the Department of the Interior should undertake an immediate survey of our commercial fishing capabilities and recommend to the Congress the means by which these capabilities can be quickly and thoroughly modernized. Our commercial fishing fleet has not had the benefit of modern technological advances, and this is an opportune time to remedy this untenable situation.

Seventh, the Secretary of the Interior, in cooperation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Economic Development Administration, should give technical assistance to towns and cities which desire to modernize their port facilities to take part in an FPC enterprise.

The regulations as issued by the FDA do not permit bulk sales of FPC to food processors unless data is provided demonstrating that the proposed use will not be deceptive to the consumer. This presents yet another opportunity for the FDA to delay before permitting the full force of the benefits of FPC to be felt by those who most need them. For if food processors cannot buy FPC in bulk until after a showing that their proposed uses will not be deceptive, it may well be years before processed foods containing FPC are marketed. I intend to follow this very closely, Mr. President, to be certain that the FDA does not delay unreasonably.

I also intend to work closely with my colleagues interested in making FPC available to a hungry world in implementing these seven recommendations. Just this week we have had a pledge from President Johnson to use the resources of the sea in carrying out the provisions of the food-for-peace program. FPC cannot in and of itself meet the food needs of the world. But, with FDA approval, the pledge of the President, and the leadership and guidance of Senators BARTLETT and MAGNUSON, I am sure that FPC can play a large role in providing nutrition for those who have too little.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

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East West Trade

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE CONSULAR CONVENTION—EAST-WEST TRADE ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as I noted in remarks several days ago, there will be before the Senate, at some future date, the question of a consular treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Sometime later in the session we may also be called upon to consider an East-West trade bill.

Both measures are sought by the administration. Both are foreshadowed in the President's state of the Union message. Both are elements in a continuing policy of improving relations with Eastern Europe.

This policy began during the Eisenhower administration. It reached a critical milestone in the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the Kennedy administration. The two measures which are now projected—the Consular Convention and the East-West Trade Act—are additional blocks which will enable President Johnson to continue to build that policy.

Although the measures are limited in purpose and readily understandable, the aid, I regret to say, is beginning to fill with fearful rumors which seriously distend and distort their intent. The sooner certain misapprehensions are corrected, the sooner the facts are put straight, therefore, the better.

In this respect, I wish to take occasion to commend the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, for the three letters which he wrote, covering the proposed consular pact. I think that Mr. Hoover should not have been asked to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Had I been present when that motion was made, I would have spoken against it and voted against it.

Mr. Hoover is not a policymaker. He is one who carries out policy. In his letters, he has, to the best of his ability, answered questions raised, but he has tried to steer clear, in my opinion, of becoming involved in any way in the consideration of the Consular Convention which will be before the Senate sometime in the future.

I think that those who tend to use Mr. Hoover's letters one way or another do him a disservice, because he has only been carrying out the functions of his office and has been trying to keep within the confines of his responsibilities. I, for one, think he has done a good job in observing and putting down on paper just what those responsibilities are in the carrying out of policy, not in the making of policy in this matter.

Let us be clear at the outset that the President is not asking for authority in either the proposed consular treaty or the East-West Trade Act to make any one-sided bestowal of anything on any nation. On that point, his messages and those of his Secretary of State are emphatic and unequivocal. Where a quid emerges from these measures, there will be a quo.

What is sought in an East-West Trade Act, for example, is a measure of discretion for the President to negotiate commercial agreements with nations of Eastern Europe. Any such agreements would have to be judged by the President to be in the national interest—in the interest of the United States. That means that they would have to embody a reasonable matching of benefits received for benefits extended.

It may be said that the United States-Soviet Consular Convention is, in some ways, more one-sided in its approach. But if it is, it is one-sided on the side of the interests of the United States. I do not see how it can be regarded as otherwise when it is noted that more and more American citizens have been traveling in the Soviet Union in recent years. In 1966, for example, the number was over 18,000, an increase of several thousand over the previous year. This number and trend contrasts with the flow of Soviet visitors to this Nation, which was less than 1,000 in all of 1966, a more or less stationary total, as compared with the previous year.

With an 18-to-1 ratio of visitors, bear in mind that the legal systems of the two nations vary in their concepts of the rights of the individual. Bear in mind, too, that U.S. laws apply to Soviet citizens when they are in this country, just as Soviet laws apply to Americans when they are in the Soviet Union. Then note, Mr. President, that the primary purpose of the proposed convention is not to open consulates—the President can do that without this convention—rather the primary purpose is to assure the right of prompt diplomatic access and support to nationals of one nation when they run afoul of the law while traveling in the territory of the other. Is there any need to ask ourselves the questions: Who has the greater requirement for the legal protection which this treaty would make possible, Americans traveling in the Soviet Union or Soviet citizens traveling in the United States?

In view of the disparity in the number of travelers as between the two nations, is it not readily apparent which has the greater need to expand its diplomatic and consular facilities in the territory of the other?

It is true, of course, that the Consular Convention will not produce an automatic mushrooming of U.S. consulates in the Soviet Union or vice versa. Indeed, it is not at all certain that it will have the effect of adding even one at this time. For here, too, with or without the convention, as I have noted, the responsibility in this Nation rests with the President to negotiate the terms on which Soviet consulates will be permitted to operate here and U.S. consulates in the Soviet Union. We have it from the Secretary of State that what is envisioned in the way of new consulates at this time is likely to be something on the order of one for one, rather than any great overall number or a lopsided ratio.

The word of the Secretary of State in this connection should set to rest some of the fear of espionage which has been associated with the proposed Consular Convention. Yet the question of espionage, since it has been raised, should be discussed openly and frankly. It is mathematically obvious that the more the sources and number of foreign representatives, the greater the prospect of improper activity of this kind. The reasoning is sound but its relevance in this situation is doubtful. On the basis of that reasoning, the only logical course would be not only to reject this proposed consular exchange but to reverse all previous consular and diplomatic exchanges. At the end of that trail is not only the demise of the proposed Consular Treaty or East-West Trade Act but the severance of every kind of existing contact with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and all foreign nations. After all, it is not unprecented to discover on occasion an employee in the embassy of a third nation selling information to a first or second country, if not, indeed, to both.

I carry the logic of this argument against the Consular Convention to an extremity only to make clear that no matter how high the walls may be built for the exclusion of contact with certain nations, there is no absolute insulation of this Nation or any nation from the possibility of espionage. Of course, there are risks of espionage for this Nation, for all nations, in new consulates, as there are in old embassies, as there are in any exchanges of persons with any nation, and in this era of advanced technology, there are risks of espionage even without exchanges of persons. That there will be risks is not the question. To the extent that there is a question here, it lies in the adequacy of the safeguards which we have established against them.

The United States has its agencies for dealing with these questionable activities, as does every other nation, including the Soviet Union. It would be my judgment that the FBI is at least as competent to control the risks in the United States as is the K.B.G. in the Soviet Union. And if there should be an increase in the responsibilities of the FBI in this respect, can there be doubt that the FBI would be supplied with what it needs to meet these additional responsibilities?

Turning to the East-West Trade Act, I would note again that there will be no automatic agreements with anyone as a result of its enactment. The application of the act will be strictly internal, involving only the authority of the President of the United States in the field of international commercial relations. The measure will merely open the door for him to enter into useful discussion and bargaining with Eastern European countries. His position for this purpose would be stronger to some degree but not to the same degree as it is for dealing with other nations. Insofar as Eastern Europe is concerned, the East-West Trade Act would not remove the prohibitions on trade in strategic goods. Agreements with the nations of that region would still have to be based on conditional rather than unconditional most-favored-nation treatment.

The most that is involved in the East-West trade bill, therefore, is a hope for a

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most modest rise in beneficial, nonstrategic commerce with Eastern Europe from the insignificant levels at which it has remained for many years. Rather than reject this prospect out of hand, it seems to me that the time is long past due to examine certain factors which are largely of our own making and which have acted to keep these levels so low.

The assumption which underlies many of the restrictions has been the belief that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have everything to gain from trade with the United States and this country has everything to lose. Some years back, it was even argued with great vigor that the cutting off of this trade would have the effect of causing the downfall of governments in Eastern Europe. Largely, on that basis, therefore, restrictions of all kinds have been loaded onto this trade by legislation or otherwise until it has been reduced to a trickle.

Whatever plausibility the assumption may have had in the years following World War II, its persistence into this day and age raises the question of whose nose is being cut off to spite whose face?

The commercial reality of Eastern Europe, today, is that a multination trading system orbits around the Soviet Union and that the individual nations also have important and growing trade links with Western Europe and other regions of the world. To be sure, that trading system may have much to gain from trade with the United States. But there is no basis for believing that it has any desperate dependence on trade with the United States any more than we have a desperate dependence on trade with that system. It is delusive to believe that continued restrictions on trade with that region, even to the point of boycott, will have any significant impact on the shaping of its economic structure.

Whatever goods the nations of Eastern Europe may seek avidly abroad, they usually find in ready supply in Western Europe, Japan, or elsewhere, other than in the United States. And even when they have had a specific preference for U.S.-type products, the truth is that they have often been able to buy them through nations in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world where U.S. subsidiaries are located.

In the light of these realities, if an East-West trade bill is adopted, it is evident that our own commerce will profit from this change as much as anyone else's. We stand to gain as much as we give.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that I am not suggesting that a trade bonanza will follow the passage of an East-West Trade Act. As I have already stated, at most, there is likely to be a small increase in the current trickle of commerce. The main point of the act, however, is no less valid. It is no less valid because present anachronistic policies not only curb volume and damage our own commerce, they also restrict the President's bargaining power with Eastern Europe on such subjects as patent rights, arbitration of commercial disputes, and tourist promotion.

I should like to add a final consideration which I believe should be weighed by the Senate in deliberation of these impending measures. The United States has signed a communique with its NATO allies. It calls for "the removal of barriers to freer and more friendly reciprocal exchanges between countries of different social and economic systems." We have also pledged this Nation to work with other members of NATO for better political, economic, social, scientific, and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It is obvious, as I pointed out some days ago in discussions of U.S. troop reductions in Europe, that our European allies have moved far on their own in these directions. Whether or not, we are prepared to recognize it, the Western Europeans know that times have changed in Europe and for Europe and that the progress of reconciling a divided continent is already well advanced. Their trade policies reflect this recognition. The great increase in travel, communications and other intra-European contacts and relations reflect it. The limited and declining contributions of men and resources which the Western Europeans are prepared to make to NATO reflect it.

I would note, in particular, the attitude of West Germany. Here is a country that is presumed to have more reason than others to fear for its security, that is presumed to have more reason than others to look to Eastern Europe with suspicion and fear. Here also is a country that is presumed to be predisposed to distrust all contacts with Eastern Europe.

Yet, here is a great trading nation that leads all the others in the West in the volume and value of its trade with Eastern Europe. And here also is a courageous nation with a new government whose first major act of foreign policy is to make it clear that it is prepared to go far in seeking by diplomacy to close the breach with Eastern Europe.

If the United States is to retain a semblance of a relevant common policy with Western Europe for the security of the North Atlantic region, changes in our policies on East-West relations are in order. If the resistance to a return to isolationism is to mean something more than merely remaining in Europe in military isolation, we will have to face up to the process of reconciliation which is proceeding, today, between Eastern and Western Europe and we will have to adjust policies in accordance therewith.

The tragedy of Vietnam, as I noted the other day, acts as a severe deterrent on the rational consideration of the consular treaty, the East-West Trade Act, or any other matter involving the Eastern European nations. But the tragedy will be compounded if it forestalls a sensible consideration of measures which have validity in themselves, measures, which in themselves, are of direct advantage to this Nation.

Finally, the Consular Convention and the East-West Trade Act are relevant elements in the continuance of the step-by-step policy of seeking to replace a dangerous rivalry and a fearful hostility with a more durable basis for the survival of world civilization in a nuclear age.

That policy is even now probing for common international ground upon which to control nuclear weapons, to negate the deployment of antiballistic-missile systems—as was brought out so well on yesterday by the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE]—and to banish war from the seas of outer space. So I repeat, Mr. President, the tragedy of Vietnam will be compounded if it causes us to shrink from the rational consideration of these two measures—from these faint but authentic lights of peace.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I commend and congratulate the majority leader for this most constructive speech with respect to two questions that require the unimpassioned analysis and serious consideration of every Senator.

It is unfortunate that, due to other senatorial responsibilities, more Senators were not present to listen to the fundamental logic of the position of the Senator from Montana on the matter of the Consular Treaty and East-West trade.

I have a copy of his address and have read it. I would like to study it further as I know other Senators will when it appears in the RECORD.

In the remarks he has made this morning, the distinguished majority leader has once again made a major contribution to clear thinking on problems vital to the security and well-being of his country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri for his kind remarks, and I know that he will give rational consideration to this proposal which could mean so much for the future of this country in the difficult months, years, and decades which lie ahead.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, a letter dated January 27, 1967, from Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Douglas MacArthur II, in response to a query from me; also, a statement on the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Consular Convention and the United States-Soviet Consular Convention—all of which was furnished me at my request.

There being no objection, the documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 27, 1967.

DEAR SENATOR: There has been a good deal of misunderstanding about the US-Soviet Consular Convention which is now pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To clear up such misunderstandings, we have issued a statement which I am enclosing in view of the general interest in this important matter.

The statement makes clear that the Consular Convention does not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for, or require the opening of a single United States Consulate in the Soviet Union, or a single Soviet Consulate in the United States. It does not permit the Soviets to send a single extra person to this country, nor does it let us send anyone to the Soviet Union.

What it does do is to provide that we will be notified of arrests of American citizens within one to three days, and allowed to see them within two to four days. As matters now stand, arrested persons can be held incommunicado until the investigation by the

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Soviet authorities is completed and this can take up to nine months or more. Last year we had 18,000 U.S. citizens visiting the Soviet Union and the number will increase. The Soviets, on the other hand, had only about 900 of their citizens visiting our country. We earnestly believe, therefore, that the balance of advantage in this Convention lies heavily with us and that it will give us the tools we need to protect American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union.

I also attach a more comprehensive but still brief statement on the purposes and effects of the Convention which I hope you will find useful. If you have any further questions about the Consular Convention please don't hesitate to let me know as I would be glad to arrange a briefing on this matter for you.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES U.S.S.R. CONSULAR CONVENTION

(Excerpt from State Department Press Briefing, Jan. 25, 1967)

Following up on Secretary Rusk's testimony on the US–USSR Consular Convention before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 23, I would like to try to clear up a persistent misunderstanding about this agreement. And I might add that this misunderstanding is common among both opponents and supporters of ratification.

The Consular Convention does not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for, or require the opening of a single United States Consulate in the Soviet Union, or a single Soviet Consulate in the United States. It does not permit the Soviets to send a single extra person to this country, nor does it let us send anyone to the Soviet Union.

What it does do is to provide ground rules for the protection of American citizens in the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens in the United States.

These ground rules, which represent major concessions by the Soviet Government, specify that we will be notified of the arrest of an American citizen within one to three days, and allowed to see him within two to four days. As a matter of routine, we grant these rights not only to Americans, but to all foreigners arrested in the United States. But, in the Soviet Union, even the Soviet citizens enjoy no such rights. They are held incommunicado until the investigation of the crime is completed; and this investigation can take nine months, or more.

These ground rules go into effect the minute the Treaty is ratified, without regard to the separate question of opening consulates. The officers attached to the Consular Section of our Embassy in Moscow will enjoy notification and access rights under this Treaty the moment both parties ratify it. Thus, tying the idea of opening consulates to the idea of approving this Convention confuses the issue. The issue is do we need better tools to help us protect Americans who get into trouble in the USSR. The answer is clearly yes.

THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET CONSULAR CONVENTION

We believe that the ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention is clearly in the national interest and, on balance, more valuable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. This Convention is part of our balanced strategy for peace, aimed at limiting the areas of disagreement in our relations with the USSR while we are resisting communist aggression wherever it occurs.

During the Eisenhower Administration, Secretary of State Christian Herter suggested to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that a bilateral Consular Convention be negotiated and first drafts were exchanged. Negotiations were completed in 1964. President Johnson called for prompt Senate approval of this agreement in both his October 7, 1966 speech in New York and his January 10, 1967 State of the Union message.

This Convention will permit this Government to assist and protect more effectively the 18,000 or more American citizens who annually travel in the USSR. If a citizen of either country is detained or arrested, the Convention requires that the embassy or consulate of that citizen's country be notified within three days and that access to the prisoner by a consular official be granted within four days. These provisions will come into force when the treaty is ratified.

Without the protection of such an agreement, Americans have frequnetly been isolated in Soviet prisons for long periods and kept from contact with American Embassy consular officers. One, Newcomb Mott, died in Soviet hands under these circumstances.

The treaty does not provide for the opening of consulates. Approval of the Convention has no bearing on this question, since under the Constitution the President can agree to reciprocal opening of consulates in the U.S. and USSR at any time.

There are no formal proposals or plans pending for the opening of separate consular offices of either country in the other. If at a later date it was decided to be appropriate to open one outside the respective capitals, it would be the subject of careful negotiation on a strict quid-pro-quo basis. Such an office would probably involve 10 to 15 Americans in the Soviet Union, with the Soviets permitted to send the same number here. In accordance with Secretary Rusk's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we would plan to consult that body and the state and local officials of the community to be affected, before concluding such an agreement. While, as noted, such an arrangement would be reciprocal, the fact that the Soviet Society is a closed one while the United States is open, and that the U.S. citizens needing service and protection while traveling in the Soviet Union far outnumber Soviet citizens with like needs in the U.S., indicate that the balance of advantage would be on our side.

This Convention gives full immunity from criminal jurisdiction to consular officers and employees of both countries. We would not send American officials or clerical employees to serve in the USSR without this protection. Since 1946, 31 Americans at our Embassy in Moscow have been expelled by the Soviets, most often on allegations of espionage. Without immunity consular employees could be jailed or suffer even harsher punishment on similar trumped-up charges. Furthermore, action against American consular personnel serving in the Soviet Union without diplomatic immunity could be a temptation to Soviet authorities whenever a Soviet citizen was arrested in this country for espionage. Other governments similarly protect their officials and clerical employees in the USSR; the British and the Japanese recently negotiated consular conventions with the Soviet Union containing immunity provisions modeled after those in the US–USSR agreement.

The opening of one Soviet consulate in the U.S. would not materially affect our internal security. The number of Soviet citizens now enjoying immunity, 452, would be increased by only 10 or 15 persons. We have the right under the treaty to screen the personnel of such an office before agreeing to their assignment. We are also authorized by the treaty to prevent them from traveling to sensitive areas in the country and to expel them if they prove to be undesirable. We could close a Soviet consulate in the U.S. whenever we wished, and we could cancel the Consular Convention on six months' notice.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation of the statement just made by the Senator from Montana. It is an effort toward acquainting the people of this country with the facts, and we have perhaps been negligent and too reticent in this respect.

As an example, I received a letter this morning complaining about and objecting to our giving wheat to Russia. Well, this is the first time I knew that we had ever given any wheat to Russia. As I remember, Russia bought some wheat from us 1 or 2 years ago and paid cash on the barrelhead for it. So far as I know, they have never asked credit from us in any way.

But, in another sense, it appears to me that some of the countries of Eastern Europe present a better field for understanding and for expansion of trade than does Russia. We produce in this country, and have to sell, much of the same items that Russia does.

However, so far as Eastern Europe countries are concerned, for several years they have been very anxious to get much closer to the West economically, and it would be a step toward getting nearer to us politically when we once trade with them. But in this country are people who say, "No, we must have nothing to do with them." If they try to loosen their ties with Russia, they say, "We won't help you. We will even punish you, if you try to get looser from the ties that bind you to the Russian Government."

Three or four months ago, a large group of American businessmen, who certainly could not be called communistic in any sense of the word, visited Eastern Europe—I believe they also went into Russia—for the purpose of laying the groundwork for expanded trade with that part of the world. Unquestionably, Eastern Europe feels much closer to the Near West than it does to the Far East. I believe that a wonderful opportunity exists to create better feeling between us.

For example, even Yugoslavia—which, with guns and ammunition obtained from us, held the Communists back from going down and overrunning Greece—Yugoslavia does about 70 percent of its business with the West—largely, West Germany, if I recall correctly—although they would prefer to do more business with the United States if we did not discourage it. Poland does as much business with the West as it does with Russia.

Further, I was interested to see that West Germany—which cannot be called communistic in any sense of the word—as Senator MANSFIELD has pointed out, has recently adopted a program of exchanging Ambassadors with Rumania. Certainly, Rumania is in many respects very Western-minded.

Why do we force them to continue to be tied to Russia in every way? People say that these countries are tied to communism. They mean that these countries are tied to the Russian Government Why do we force these countries to do that, when they hope to become closer to us? I believe that what the Senator

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from Montana has said could well be repeated.

Yesterday, I referred to the fact that I receive much hate mail—and I receive some that is not hate mail—from people who actually believe what they are writing. You can recognize the organization mail, the agitators' mail, because it all starts out about the same and winds up the same. But a lot of good people in the United States are misinformed, and for that reason they take positions which, I believe, they would not take if they were well advised as to the facts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as always, I am indebted to my distinguished colleague and friend, the senior Senator from Vermont.

The Senator mentioned receiving a letter from a constituent asking about the amount of wheat we had "given" Russia. Strangely enough, I have received the same sort of mail, and I have written back and told them that we had not given the Russians any wheat, that we did enter into commercial contracts with the Russians, which were repayable in gold over an 18-month period.

Do I state the situation correctly?

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator is correct. They paid full price and paid it in gold, as I recall. They paid the regular market price for the wheat they bought.

Mr. MANSFIELD. And they entered into the regular commercial 18-month contract.

Mr. AIKEN. No; I think they paid cash. The regular terms are 18 months. They may have entered into that agreement. They did with Canada, I know. But, certainly, they paid what in effect was cash—so much at the beginning and so much on certain periods thereafter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As a matter of fact, if I recall correctly, they made a rather large downpayment at the very beginning.

Mr. AIKEN. Yes, they did. I cannot remember now what percentage it was, but they paid a goodly percentage at the very beginning, when the deal was made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wonder sometimes just what we are thinking about in this country when we do not take advantage of situations and make moves which would react to our benefit. As the distinguished Senator from Vermont has brought out, Eastern Europe countries would like to move closer to the near West rather than in the direction of the Far East, and that is true, in part, because culturally they are more inclined toward the West. If we can sell goods in those countries, if demands are created for our goods, I think it is quite possible on that basis, as well as others, that modifications of the economic system there might result.

It is disturbing to note, therefore, that despite the attitude of the U.S. Government in supporting moves by one of the large rubber companies to enter into a contract with an Eastern European country and by a large American motor company which is encountering difficulties in endeavoring to enter into a major contract having to do with the Soviet Union, I believe, pressures have been created in the United States which have forced these companies to back out of these moves which they thought would be in their own best interests and which would not have been detrimental to the interests of the United States. In the case of the American motorcar company, it has had some hard times and this was an opportunity to pick up some of the slack, to expand production and employment and perhaps to increase what little profits, if any, it had.

Here we have these proposals which are small steps along the road which we would hope leads to peaceful solution, to the diminution of the fear and the distrust and the frustration which confront our people. Here we have proposals, and especially the consular convention, which are clearly and unequivocally in the interest of the United States, being distorted, being made the subject of dishonest propaganda, being used by activists and lobbying groups, to create a situation which, in my mind, has placed the consular convention in unwarranted danger.

I am sure that the Members of the Senate, however, will look at this matter purely on the basis of the facts, and I would hope that they ask themselves one question: If there is to be a consulate in the Soviet Union, do we want to give the Americans who are employed in that consulate the full protection which diplomatic immunity will allow them to have?

Or if a consulate is established—and it can be established without any action being taken by the Senate—do we want to send Americans there to a consulate to take their chances and if picked up, for some reason or no reason, to be subject to 9 months in jail, as Soviet citizens are, without having the right of any protective immunity which should be theirs, if for no other reason than that they are employees of the American Government.

I cannot understand people who are opposed to this proposal and who are not willing to give our own people the maximum possible diplomatic protection in the Soviet Union. If we had had this convention before, maybe Mr. Newcomb Mott might be alive today.

I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I think that the American people have been not only uninformed but misinformed. As the Senator from Montana undoubtedly knows, we are getting large amounts of mail now saying that the Soviets will establish four consulates in this country and that will give them great opportunity for spying. Of course, every consulate in every country, every embassy from every country is supposed to learn all that it can about what is going on in other countries. The Soviets have a much easier time in learning what is going on in the United States than we do in learning what is going on in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Exactly.

Mr. AIKEN. If there is a new machine invented they go to a trade convention and get the information with respect to it there. If they want maps and other documents which might be called semiclassified they can buy them from the Government Printing Office here. It is not difficult for them to get information because we are proud to tell the rest of the world what we are doing and the progress we are making. But we have difficulty in getting information from over there. I think it is perhaps more difficult to find out what is going on in the interior of Russia than any other place in the world, unless it is China.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. As I said yesterday, I had not given too much consideration to this consular treaty until I began to realize that it was for our protection, rather than giving added advantages to the Russians, that our Government was so anxious to have it agreed to. It would not give us advantages over them; it would give us equal advantages with them for the protection of our people stationed overseas.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have received literally hundreds of letters in connection with this treaty. I have not received one letter in favor of it, not a single letter, because most of them come from groups; a good many of them are organized, and a great many of them start out, "I am disturbed," or "We are disturbed," and one can see that it is the same letter that comes in by the bushel.

Mr. AIKEN. I have received the same type letters. They start out, "I am disturbed."

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. All of the letters start out in that manner. Two-thirds of them start out in that manner. The body of the letter is almost exactly the same until we get to the signature.

I am sure those people are not accurately informed. Perhaps some of them are. Those people who write the original suggested letters know what they are doing. They are doing very well. They are trying to get revenge on the country from which they were, perhaps, expelled at one time or another. But when they come here they should abide by the laws and the rules of the United States, and they should not be continually trying to stir up hatred and violence, even against——

Mr. MANSFIELD. Anybody.

Mr. AIKEN. Countries which perhaps we do not like. But our difficulties with them are not going to be settled by invasion, by wars, by nuclear warfare, or by anything of that type.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct. As always, the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] gets to the point quickly.

Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that this convention is not necessary for the setting up of consulates. If the President wants to establish an American consulate in the Soviet Union he has that authority right now and has only to negotiate with the Soviet authorities. The same applies in reverse.

If the President entered into an agreement and allowed the Soviet Union to establish a consulate here they would have the full protection of the laws of this country. But if a consulate, in return, was established in Archangel, Leningrad, or some other place outside the consulate itself, all of the people on that staff would be under Soviet law and they would not have the protection which a Soviet citizen would have here in this situation. An American in the Soviet

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Union would have only the same kind of protection, without this convention, that a Soviet citizen has there.

If there are going to be 10 to 15 more Soviet personnel here—as has been estimated—attached to a consulate, and they are too much for us to handle, what would we say if the United Nations Soviet delegation or the Embassy delegations in Washington added 10 or 15 more to their staffs? Would we not be up against the same proposition?

I think we ought to understand the facts involved here. I wish to repeat that this convention is not necessary if the President wants to arrange with the Soviet Union to establish consulates in this country. But unless this convention is ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, any Americans who are attached to an American consulate in the Soviet Union will not receive diplomatic protection, but will be subject to the laws to which the ordinary Soviet citizen is subject. That means he can be held for up to 9 months without any notification being given to anyone. Therefore, this convention, as I look at it from every angle, is overwhelmingly in favor of the United States, and I hope it will be supported in the Senate when the time comes for its consideration.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of Virginia in the chair.) Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1967

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. 355.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 355), to improve the operation of the legislative branch of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may call up amendment No. 37, which is at the clerk's desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment (No. 37) as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 37

Beginning with line 15, page 26, strike out all to and including line 8, page 27, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(b) Each Senator who on the day preceding the effective date of title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967 was serving as a member of any standing committee shall be entitled to continue to serve on each such committee of which he was a member on that day as long as his service as a member of such committee remains continuous after that day. Each Senator who on the day preceding the effective date of title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967 was a member of more than one committee of the classes described in the second sentence of subparagraph (a) shall be entitled to serve on each such committee of which he was a member on that day as long as his service as a member of that committee remains continuous after that day. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, each committee of the Senate shall be temporarily increased in membership by such number as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this subparagraph".

Beginning with the word "carry" in line 14, page 27, strike out all to and including the words "or to" in line 15, page 27.

On page 27, line 23, immediately after the word "committees", insert the words "under this subparagraph or subparagraph (a)".

On page 28, line 1, immediately after the word "paragraph", insert the words "or subparagraph (a)".

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, this amendment is offered because several Senators were fearful that the original language on this matter might be ambiguous with reference to the extent that the grandfather clause allows Senators to serve on their three present major committees where they now serve, but limiting their service, if they leave one of those three committees, to only two following that time. It also protects Senators presently serving on two committees from losing their positions because of the reduction in committee size, provided for in the bill.

This amendment is an effort, I think long overdue, to limit the assignment of various Senators to two major committees and one minor, joint, select, or special committee. However, in order not to impinge on those Senators who have three major committee assignments today, largely because of the upgrading of the Government Operations Committee and the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, this amendment will make certain that they may keep the three assignments they have as long as they continue to serve on those three standing committees. But if they leave one of those three committees, then their assignments shall be limited to two major committees, and they cannot be given a third assignment on a major committee.

The amendment makes crystal clear their entitlement to keep their present major committee assignments as long as they serve on them, but to make certain that if they discontinue membership on one of the three, they shall not be entitled to pick out a third major committee and serve on it.

I am happy to offer the amendment. I think it clarifies the language and will clarify the intent of the language.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I think the language proposed by the Senator from Oklahoma is quite useful. I should like to ask the Senator whether I correctly understand its scope. The present rule XXV of the Senate provides, in subsection 4, that—

Each Senator shall serve on two and no more of—

A series of committees, mostly major committees—

Provided, however, That those Senators who, as of January 9, 1963, were members of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences or the Committee on Government Operations—

Omitting some irrelevant matter—

shall be entitled to serve on three—

Of these committees.

As I understand the Senator's present proposal, it makes no essential change in the present rule; does it?

Mr. MONRONEY. Only to make certain that Senators can keep present assignments and that, if a Senator gives up one of the three assignments, he would not then be entitled to choose a third major committee, of which he is not at present a member.

This makes the grandfather clause feature work, but when they leave that third major committee, they reduce their committee membership to two.

That would affect primarily those who have taken the three major committees because of the addition of Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the addition of the Committee on Government Operations as a major committee.

Mr. CLARK. As I understand it, the Senator provides in his bill——

Mr. MONRONEY. This is a joint committee effort. I am honored to have it referred to as my bill, but so many gentlemen have worked on it so long——

Mr. CLARK. I amend my comment: The bill which he has so ably floor managed on behalf of the joint committee.

Another section of the bill provides for the reduction in number of members on various committees. As I recall, for example, the Foreign Relations Committee is reduced from 19 to 15. As I understand, there is now or will be, a similar grandfather clause on that provision, so that, to use the same example, present members of the Foreign Relations Committee will hold their seats, but as vacancies occur they will not be filled. Is that correct?

Mr. MONRONEY. That is the intent of the language in the bill, and this language will also make it clear that they will also be entitled to just two major committees.

Mr. CLARK. So does the language presently under consideration cover the problem of the size of the committees as well as the part of rule XXV which I have just stated?

Mr. MONRONEY. That is my understanding, and the language is drawn to bring that about. Further language in

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